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The mythical link between creativity and illness is like a cat with multiple lives: in the 18th century, as some German writers first codified it in a modern framework others attacked it. Yet even ideological struggles against this link have often had the effect of rejuvenating its mythical force. Both the writings of genius and madness have traditionally appeared as articulations of a basically original and irreproducible nature. In this sense, the concept of origin is key to the cult of the irrational genius. Indeed, origin and originality power not only the discrete discourses of madness and writing, irrationality and creativity, but also their very coupling. Art, it seems, relies on the irrational aura that origins lend it. Yet what happens if aesthetic production does not root itself in the determined unreason of creative origins, but in imitation, semblance, and repetition?
In its 18th-century form, the link between madness and creativity responds to French Enlightenment arguments that classical, rationally comprehensible models are the true originals that must be emulated. In the logic of rhetoric, origins serve to legitimize the positions that speakers take. Western Europe had long justified particular, historically determined forms of politics, society, and art by elevating them to superhistorical models with privileged origins. Monarchs ruled because they descended from heroic precursors; society took a hierarchical organization because it traced itself back to divine patterns; aesthetic norms prevailed because they derived from classical models. Yet as 18th-century writers like Herder noticed, the use of origins for legitimacy becomes absurd when a plurality of aesthetic, social, and political phenomena exists, each with its own origin.1
This plurality of origins caused writers to confront extensive implications that ultimately generated the figure of the irrational genius as an explanation for origins. Yet, the most significant factor in this shift is something very different from a plurality of origins: at stake was the very event of originality itself. Within their proper discursive fields, aesthetic and sociopolitical models now had to posit their own origins. Poetic and poetological texts took on the role of positing origins. Herder, comparing the original, authentic poet with divinity, makes this clear. For him, the artist who eavesdrops (belauschen) on nature and produces from it art is "der eigentliche Mensch, und da er selten erscheint, ein Gott unter den Menschen. Er spricht und tausende lallen ihm nach."2 Herder contends that the genius, with his initially incomprehensible works, explains how culture generates products that cannot be deduced from models.
A detailed consideration of the way this curious historical shift came about would be an interesting undertaking but would exceed the scope of this study. What interests me here is the way the connection of genius, madness, and origin is again at stake in the wake of 20th-century totalitarian politics. I locate the reexamination of this connection in two poems by Paul Celan-"Tilbingen, Jainner" (1961) and "Ich trink Wein" (1969). These poems invite and address the question of what happens when aesthetic production is not rooted in the unreason of creative ori-gins, but rather in imitation, semblance, and repetition?
My discussion places these poems in the context of the discursive history of madness and genius, and investigates Celan's critique of this culturally constructed link. Particular attention will be paid to the poetic technique of repetition and semblance, and to Celan's recitation of H ilderlin. These poems seek to undermine the notion of prophecy and origins at the center of the genius ideology. In them, Celan returns to the coupling of illness with writing not only to disentangle them but also to redeem madness by removing it from a psychological discourse. Thus, for Celan, writing provides neither access to origins nor one-to-one correspondences to external, non-linguistic things, rather it produces illusions and words that will be repeated and altered. In his poetry, this repetitive nature of writing is figured as a kind of Wahn. The disentanglement of madness and poetry, the critique of original geniality, and the reinterpretation of madness itself emerge as politically and ethically motivated.
The history of the genius has been narrated.3 However, readers have overlooked the way the connection between the discursive field of madness and the concept of originality culminates in the 18t-century figure of the genius. Johann Georg Hamann was the first to assert fiercely the link between madness and the genius in Germany's 181h-century intellectual scene.4 Arguing that prophets, notable writers, and poets bore "die Wirkung eines Genies" (104), he claimed that a divinely inspired form of prophetic enthusiasm could manifest itself as madness and that these poets and prophets were denounced because they were seen as being mentally ill. Hamann's views reveal the dual value of madness as both affliction and badge of distinction: depending on the observer's position, the same phenomena count as madness in terms of either an enthusiastic and prophetic higher truth or a purely negative, abnormal condition.
This connection between creativity and divinely fated, poetic madness continues in various forms well into the 20 century. PreRomantic and Romantic culture was enamored with the myth of the genius's madness as a form of divine intervention. This discourse bestowed upon the creative figure the quality of madness whereby he derived his singularity. Madness was, on the one hand, an enthusiasm, or on the other hand, divine retribution for having dared to transgress human limitations. Either way, the mad poet's link to god is the channel for the world's enchantment with a divine presence.
To be sure, late 18t-century culture had witnessed the separation of religion and art, the differentiation into distinct social spheres described by Max Weber. Hamann was perhaps the last key player in the intellectual scene who held onto the notion of direct, divine inspiration. Yet, in compensating for the gap left by this move away from explicitly divine connections, writers turned to vague claims of divinely natural powers as a form of genial inspiration. H*lderlin's first biographer, Wilhelm Waiblinger, codified a view of H*lderlin that his poetry would invite: "Einer der wahnsinnig wird aus Gottestrunkenheit, aus Liebe und aus Streben nach G6ttlichem."5
Michel Foucault provides ample evidence that society long viewed the mentally ill as flawed, antisocial figures.6 Add to this the 18t-century notion that the genius is "autistic," and one begins to see the barely concealed similarity between genius and madman. Both are seemingly self-absorbed, act independently, and define their reality without reference to exterior authorities. Autonomous, they appear to speak to and address either themselves or no one. This autonomy, however, reveals a paradox and a price to pay. The creative individual can only posit itself by liberating itself from societal constraints, prevailing ideologies, and frustrating aesthetic norms. Yet madness describes the genius's fate; for the very act by which he asserts himself also makes him ill. In works by Goethe (Tasso), E. T. A. Hoffmann (Die Elixiere des Teufels), and Biichner (Lenz), the writer pays for his sensitivity to the con-Fall 2002 tradiction between art and life with his sanity. As a result of the break between the real and the imaginative the genius drifts from reality into a Wahnwelt that discursively compensates as salvation for an absent, blessed state.
That madness occupies a shared ground with originality is at first not evident: both the products of genius and madness may seem to be fancy; they neither ground themselves on a universally accessible logic nor define themselves based on previous models. A form of originality, though standing in contradistinction to the form proper to poetry, madness is a seemingly empty and perverted form. This is because the essential function of the genius in his modern incarnation locates itself in the concept of originality, what Kant in the Kritik der Urteilskraft calls the genius's "erste Eigenschaft."7 The genius defines and makes possible a precious, divinely natural resource, renewable only through him who can access the source. Kant acknowledges the affinity between madness and geniality and that both are joined by the principle of originality. Yet the fact that other works will follow and model themselves after a genial predecessor-through this repetition actually producing the original as original-would distinguish poetry (genius) from madness. In other words, the poet would produce works that will later provide the rules by which future works of art can be created and judged. The product of madness, on the other hand, is a freak occurrence, a negative originality that never becomes a rule.
Science provides 19th-century culture with the dominant episteme and metalanguage for explaining itself. Examining the role of scientific explanations for the world, Weber argued that Western society is the society of "Entzauberung." Rational, intellectual explanations for both nature and society visibly replace the meanings of the world that rest primarily on magical, stereotypical interpretations. For Weber, this intellectualism is the claim that all natural and cultural phenomena can be clarified, that one could prove that no irrational powers were at work, "daB man vielmehr alle Dinge--im Prinzip -durch Berechnen beherrschen k6nne."8 It can be no surprise then that the logic of science comes to define the link between creativity and madness; science promises the end of the divine ground for this link. Yet in a peculiar twist, the promise is not kept; for the very scientific language that assists in separating religion from the aestheticrather than presiding over the dissolution of the discursive field of madness and creativity altogether-reintroduces into this field the atmosphere of prophecy and myth. It accomplishes this through scientific rhetoric of pathological decline.
Goethe For Celan, the rewriting of H6lderlin's "reinentsprungenes" is madness. This is the determinant moment of "Tfibingen, J-n-ner" where the poem goes beyond the effect of decoupling madness from writing. In his replacement of imitation and repetition for originality and inspiration Celan discursively reinterprets madness. It is with an eye to what one contends is a fact of language, its repeatability, that he critiques the ideology of the mad poet. The madness of modernity entails an exposure to the repeatability and proliferation of language, the unavoidable excess of symbolic production, which blinds the eyes in "Tiibingen, Jainner." The blindness is not a consequence of having drunken from a source of creativity, as in the myth of the genius. Rather, madness is the constituent feature of writing to become dispersed into different languages and functions and be uprooted from fixed contexts and origins. The eyes' memory-a form of repetition itself-does not recall a singular moment. Rather it names the dispersal of "schwimmende H61lderlintiirme." This dispersal evokes the many myths of Holderlin that are rooted in a prophetic, tragic illness, as well as the readings of these myths, a babble (the "Turm" itself graduating from Halderlin's tower to that of Babel) of memories and interpretations.
Because it signifies a proliferation of both perspectives and languages, what JeanFranqois Lyotard refers to as the concept of "languages games," "which accepts agonistics as a founding principle," Wahn, is ethically motivated. 19Nazi politics subsumed all languages and social spheres beneath the one metadiscourse of racial destiny. A poetry of Wahn, a tower of Babel, not only describes and practices a writing of agonistic languages as a historical condition, it also has the effect of interrupting constructions of total perspectives.
The words Blindheit and Augen, of course, move the poem's language into a discourse of visual perception. Celan's poetry commonly combines vocabulary that connotes vision, on the one hand, with vocabulary that connotes speech, reading, or writing, on the other. In "Tiibingen, J~inner" this combination of reden and Augen has a specific effect. This poem attributes a shared penchant to the mechanics of both perception and speech (writing and reading). Both perception and writing are systems driven by semblance and repetition. Writing is the rewriting of other phrases and not a medium for attaining access to essential or original phenomena. So too is perception an act by which the eye registers "illusions" that provide an imperfect knowledge about visual phenomena, that is, about other illusions. Thus the quality of semblance inherent to writing and perception makes them both wahnhaft, and the knowledge that a world of appearances provides is subject to the uncertainty of illusions.
It is perhaps no surprise that a poem criticizing origins and prophecy turns to a vocabulary of a paradisiacal age. The repetition of the subjunctive wish-in which its construction by accumulation is laid barestands in contrast to the statement's pro- The last line-the utterance "Pallaksch" is attributed to Holderlin by his first biographer, Christoph Theodor Schwab---encapsulates Celan's technique. That Celan was aware of the legend behind this word is beyond dispute; for he writes in a letter to his lover, Ilana Schmueli, in 1969: "darunter soll H5lderlin, in der Zeit seiner Umnachtung, Ja und zugleich Nein verstanden haben."'21 On its own, "Pallaksch" is seemingly a pure chance word (Breithaupt, 650). Appearing once, it would remain an emphatic evocation of H-lderlin's divine, mad utterance. It would become an enchanted word whose encrypted mystery persists in defiance of a rationalized world. Celan repeats precisely this word that is overcoded with contexts of madness. That which happens once, as the adage goes, is an accident, twice a coincidence, and three times a pattern. Chance is typically understood in singular terms. Yet this is only partially true; the single occurrence may also possess the appearance of what is divinely given. In this sense, the products of the genius are seen as unpredictable, singular and divinely inspired works. The language of madness, on the other hand, appears as a meaningless, chance event (or its only meaning is its singularity). Celan's repetition of Ho"lderlin's Pallaksch works against both the singularity of the genial product and the nonsense of a random utterance having no conventional meaning. It takes on meaning only with its repetition. Only in this way can it become a word, rather than a chance utterance. Celan's repetition of the word effectively removes H6lderlin's poetry from the field of psychological madness. Chance however is not banished completely from the poem. For though Celan repeats the word, by making meaning-which it would not have as a purely chance event-possible through its repetition, the particularity of its meanings cannot be completely determined.
Readers working against the nearly crushing tide of biography, sentimental anecdote, and positivism in Celan scholarship have forcefully argued that this poem does not convey a biographical moment. Nevertheless, "Tfibingen, Janner" brings together what Derrida provisionally refers to as the poem's "exterior" (the date at which Celan wrote the poem) and "interior" (the dates that the poem encodes) dates.22 The title stands in an inexact correlation to the date of the poem's writing and situation. Indeed, Celan wrote the poem, a variant title of which included "1961," on January 29th, 1961, after returning to Paris from a one-day visit to Tiibingen. Celan was in Tiibingen to receive a written position paper from Walter Jens that he believed might help him in his efforts to respond to the charges of plagiarism leveled against him by Claire Goll, the widow of the poet Ivan Goll. That Celan begins "Tiibingen, Janner" with a marked quotation of H*lderlin's "Der Rhein," which thematizes originality, is significant in light of the purpose of this visit. The poem undermines the cult of innovation, its theoretical implications and underpinnings in terms of authoritative, authorial guardianship of meaning. Claire Goll used precisely the seemingly innocuous concepts of originality and authorial propriety to attack Celan's poetic production by accusing him of plagiarizing her husband's works. "Tiibingen, Janner" calls into question the author's proprietary claim to texts. Celan's analysis of origins, however, is not only, not primarily, "personal." Rather, he levels his critique at the politics of originality.
In "Tiibingen, Janner," Celan's recitation of H6lderlin's "Der Rhein" in his division of the crucial word (iiber-reden) discredits authority derived from origins. Celan explicitly uses specific, repeated words ("lallen," and "Pallaksch") which, if appearing only once, would be "glossolalia" (the incomprehensible words of mad poetry), with the effect of staging a clash with the poem's rhetoric of originality. Thus both through the precise use of quotation marks and repeated key words (including the insane utterances of Woyzeck), Celan posits that all writing is wrenched from determined origins: one cannot attribute statements to vague theological originality. By textually inscribing the name Hdlderlin and the topos of mad poetry, Celan appropriates the madness of this tradition. Yet he takes on the qualities of prophetic enthusiasm and psychological abnormality only to reinterpret madness as the constituent aspect of language that humans face. Once we have written words, we set them free and will use them in arbitrary contexts with no necessary relation to real, external objects or origins. By pointing to the poem's figure of a blinding excess of speech, I have claimed that, for Celan, madness is the penchant of language to frustrate human attempts to turn it into a reliable instrument. This is because the range of languages produces an incommensurability, and the disjunct between words and origins makes it impossible to see in language a system of seamless correspondences.
While "Tiibingen, Jainner" uses repetition to counter the ideology of originality, Celan's later poem, "Ich trink Wein," returns to H61lderlin and madness to undermine messianic notions: Celan employs the compositional technique of similarity and semblance as cornerstones in his case against the claim that appearances and words provide access to secured knowledge.
In the first strophe the Ich is like "Jener"; here god appears "as one of the small just ones." The reduction of god to an appearance of one of many is accomplished in the repetitions of G-in this strophe: Gott, gibt, Stimmgabel, Gerechten, denying and emptying out the presence of god's singularity and incomparability.
The image of god surrendering the "Stimmgabel" is a signal that language as a system of utterances that tether themselves to origins and objects is at an end. The "Stimmgabel" is, as Grimms notes, the tool "zur Feststellung und Kontrollierung der absoluten Tonh6he, von Stimmen" (vol.10, 3117). The word takes on an etymological meaning of stimmen: "etwas nennen, festsetzen," "nahmhaft machen, bezeichnen, anordnen u.s.w. urpsriinglich als eigentliche mfindliche AulBerung vorgestellt" (3091). God gives away the "naming-fork," surrendering the means for giving and speaking the names of things, for ordering, arranging, and identifying the phenomenal world. Language, now out of the range of the divine, is disenchanted. What remains are words that we can use to respond to other words and situations-a series of copies and semblances, repetitions without given models. As god turns in the "Stimmgabel," the work in-volved in reading, problematizing, and interpreting a speaker's situation, now comes to the fore.
Tipping out of the lottery drum in the final lines is not fate (Los), as one might expect, but the coin, the doit, what has little value, almost nothing: aus der Lostrommel flillt unser Deut.
The Deut may evoke Deutung; yet it actually signifies the very potential for meaning. The potential is legible in this complete word for coin that at the same is the fragmented word for Deutung. According to Celan's poem, we receive no fate, no lot. In the place of fate are coins, a circulating medium that we can use to approximate other coins, other words; but these are words for which there is no given standard or value, due to the end of a normative conception of meaning. The Deut that falls from a lottery drum is furthermore the product of chance, a gamble, thus stressing the indeterminacy of moments in which meaning is produced.
Celan's poem mobilizes the trope of humanity's separation from a messiah. The "K6nigszasur" is specifically the caesura of the king.25 One may link the poem's concern with the king to the two glasses of the first longer line: "ICH TRINK WEIN aus zwei Gldsern." The two glasses connote the chain of texts from Pindar to Holderlin to the poem's Ich who drinks from them. Zbikowski offers a reading of the two glasses at the beginning of Celan's poem (206). On the Seder evening of the Passover, during which each person receives a glass, a second glass is placed in front of the host's seat, meant for the prophet Elias--a precursor to the messiah. I would briefly extend this reading and argue that in Celan's poem, the Ich drinks from both glasses, emptying out the glass that would otherwise signal amessianic age.
The interruption of the messiah as king interrupts a redemptive narrative. Celan's Zackern on the Kbnigszdsur is a doubled cutting away at a central and meaningful interruption in a redemptive presence. A key letter from the first three lines further accomplishes the cutting: the z in zwei, zackere, zasur links these three words whose meaning turns on division. Celan claims that in a world in which the access to the divine or to the ontic reality behind words and images is barred, the power of semblance and comparison remains: writing as recitation without originals, illusion, Wahn. As Celan wrote in a letter: "In der K6nigszisur, da stehen wir, liegen wirjetzt" (Schmueli 35). The Kbnigszdsur names a fallen world, and the poem's Ich zackert toward marking and finding a place within this interruption. The attempt itself cannot be a pure success, something that Celan seems to have realized in paraphrasingzackern, to plow and to author with "pfuschen," that is, to bungle (33).
More than "Tiibingen, Jdnner," "Ich trink Wein" claims that writing and appearances are illusions of illusions, appearances of appearances. For classical theories of knowledge, from Plato to Schopenhauer to the neo-Athenian positions of 20th-century thinkers such as Leo Strauss, the world of particular appearances is mere opinion, doxa, delusion, Wahn. This perspective defines appearances to be repetitious counterfeits of authoritative origins or transcendent truths to which we still have access. Materialist claims, on the other hand, consign perception and truth to the realm of material entities only. They deny the reality of imaginative and playful phenomena by which the aesthetic can propose new realities. Celan's poetry offers us a way to think beyond this impasse. Wahn, in this sense, defines the world both in its impoverishment and its wealth. The illusory nature of writing, instead of furnishing us with genuine and primitive meanings, provides imperfect opinions and ways to produce unforeseen actual possibilities that cannot be deduced through strict materialism.
To return to the question that I posed at the beginning-what happens if aesthetic production is rooted not in the unreason of a singular creative origin, but is driven by imitation, semblance, and repetition? Celan's
